A critique of the traditional and the post-gettier theories of justification: an intervention with epistemological functionalism

In their quest to refute the sceptics’ challenge to the possibility of knowledge, epistemologists have over the years strived to demonstrate how our beliefs can be appropriately justified. This paper critically examines two of these traditional or anti-sceptical theories of justification, namely: Foundationalism and Coherentism, as well as three famous post-Gettier theories of justification: Reliability, Defeasibility and Causal theories. Notwithstanding their relevant contributions in clarifying the conditions for the justification of knowledge, the paper argues that none of these theories attains the requirements of rational success without vulnerability to the sceptics’ challenge, since each is nettled with some identified epistemic defects, especially due to their emphasis on a single and fixed idea of rational justification – with preference for formal adequacy over functional efficacy of knowledge claim in human inquiry. As a way forward, the paper argues for epistemic justification in a functionalistic framework and concludes with the positive recommendation of this perspective as a more viable alternative approach to epistemic justification. The expository and critical methods of philosophical analysis are adopted in the work.